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ABSTRACT

The Institute of Medicine (IOM) reports in 1999, To Err is Human –
Building a Safer Health System and 2001, Crossing the Quality Chasm sought to
transform the culture of American hospitals. The culture of blame needed to
become a culture of safety if we were ever to reduce and prevent errors and
create a system of care organized around patient not provider needs.

Abington Memorial Hospital began its journey to create a culture of safety
in December 1999 and today in 2010 we continue that journey. Much has been
done and our organization has truly advanced in our transparency and focus on
systems improvement. This paper describes our journey over the past decade
and our strength of commitment to continuous improvement in search of perfect
care for our patients.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In December 1999 the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published To Err is
Human – Building a Safer Health System. A wake-up call for American
Healthcare, this document claimed that approximately 98,000 people each year
were killed in U.S. hospitals because of healthcare workers’ errors. These errors
included, for example, medication problems, falls and procedures. There were
also errors in judgment, knowledge deficits, and some lapses in thinking. Many
people in healthcare contested the data, but no one could refute the overall
premise. It was assumed that error had become acceptable in hospitals in large
part because human beings are not perfect. We all make mistakes; therefore,
there will be errors in healthcare. However, the IOM report changed that
paradigm. It argued that with a systems approach, “care processes” could be
designed to reduce many of the human errors in healthcare.
At Abington Memorial Hospital (AMH), a number of us read the report.
We immediately accepted the basic premise that systems designed for safety
would dramatically reduce the number of errors. This was because since 1991,
Lucian Leape and his colleagues had been assiduously documenting the need
for a systems approach to manage healthcare errors and particularly, medication
errors, before the watershed IOM report was published. Table 1 summarizes
some of the milestone events.
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Table 1. Medical Errors Documented Sequence
1991 -

Lucian Leape, MD and 9 co-authors from the Harvard School of
Public Health, published a study in the New England Journal of
Medicine about the nature of adverse events in hospitalized
patients.

1994 -

Boston Globe Reporter, Betsy Lehman died from a chemotherapy
overdose at the Dana Farber Cancer Institute in Boston.

1995 -

Lucian Leape, MD and 18 co-authors published a study in JAMA
about a systems analysis of adverse drug events.

1997 -

Lucian Leape, MD testified before Congress about hospital errors.

1998 -

IOM Quality of Health Care in America Committee was formed to
develop a strategy that would result in a threshold improvement in
the quality of healthcare over the next 10 years.

1999 -

IOM Report To Err is Human was released.

In the early 1990’s, the press began to focus on individual errors and the
Boston Globe ran a series on medical errors focusing on how errors could be
prevented and the lack of regulatory oversight of hospital quality. The Globe
used 2 years of the Massachusetts Department of Health (DOH) data of
significant hospital incidents reported to the DOH. The series highlighted Betsy
Lehman’s death in 1994.
In September 1999, the Philadelphia Inquirer (Gerlin, 1999) ran a series
written by Andrea Gerwin describing medical errors, focusing on how errors
could be prevented, and the lack of regulatory oversight of hospital quality. The
Inquirer used malpractice claims data for MCP Hospital obtained from Allegheny
bankruptcy court documents. The series highlighted individual malpractice
cases.
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Both newspapers focused on the sensationalism around very disturbing
cases of serious injury or death to innocent patients. Hospitals, administrators,
and physicians wanted to do the right thing, improve care and reduce errors but a
culture of safety requires transparency. The press and the trial lawyers also
wanted transparency but also to provoke and punish those providers involved in
errors.
At AMH, we set out to learn as much as we could as quickly as we could
about this field. We pursued two routes: individual self-study, and group study
through guest lectures, conferences and grand rounds. I began my own course
of study with a review of the literature regarding accident theory.
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CHAPTER 2
ACCIDENT THEORY
The Industrial Revolution was enabled in part with fossil fuel driven
technology. This allowed production of massive amounts of electric power,
harnessing natural forces, and technology involved in nuclear power, unleashing
nature’s force through manipulation of the atomic structure. Each of these
sources of energy has its own set of risks and complications. Each could have
devastating effects on the surrounding environment and people as the energy
source is extracted from nature. The changes that resulted can be understood
as due to the complexity and coupling of the technologies that evolved. In a
linear relationship, such as a production line, products, services, people and
processes are added one at a time. In a complex enterprise, multiple,
simultaneous steps occur with no opportunity for anyone to see or follow all of
the actions at one time. Complexity is beyond one’s cognitive limits to process
simultaneously.
The mechanisms that we have developed to assist us in producing,
processing and creating output have become increasingly sophisticated. We
have evolved from using rudimentary computers that were sophisticated
typewriters and adding machines to microchips that can process and synthesize
information far more efficiently than can the human mind. It is important to say
that humans have created computers. We design them, build them, repair them,
improve them, manage them, and they now can do many but not all tasks
beyond human capability. They are faster and have greater memory capacity.
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Computers have transformed our lives but they also have transformed our
designs. To stretch, to grow, to reach new levels we have taken our basic linear
designs and created tightly coupled, very complex designs driven by computer
technology to create outputs far greater than our traditional methodologies. For
example, compare a coal-fired furnace designed to burn fossil fuels and generate
heat that can be converted to a source of energy to a nuclear power plant that is
designed to accelerate nuclear particles to create energy that can provide
electricity for a region. Both are designed to be managed and maintained by
humans; but the first is more linear and the second has a more geometric design.
The key variables that differentiate the two are complexity and coupling.
Complexity involves numerous simultaneous and often interacting actions
that must occur for the output to be obtained. Coupling is the interconnectivity of
the actions and the time it takes for one action to trigger the subsequent action.
Charles Perrow (1999) described these concepts in his book, Normal Accidents.
He defines high-risk technologies as those that have “catastrophic potential, the
ability to take the lives of hundreds of people at one time, or to shorten or cripple
the lives of thousands or millions more.” Perrow describes high-risk technologies
such as nuclear power plants, chemical plants, space missions, dams, nuclear
weapons, and genetic engineering.
Perrow (1999) presents the theory that interactive complexity and tightly
coupled designs will inevitably produce accidents (errors). Given the design, he
argues, these accidents are normal. Failure is expected to occur since nothing is
perfect. What Perrow articulates is similar to James Reason’s (2008) concept of
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the Swiss Cheese Model (Reason, 1991) of error. Both purport that systems
(including medical processes) involve multiple steps that are interconnected. A
failure in one part of the process may be insignificant, even trivial, but when
various parts fail, the cumulative failures can be catastrophic. It is the interaction
of the multiple failures that explains the accident. The concept is particularly
relevant in healthcare. Perrow (1999) notes, “Small failures abound in big
systems. Reconstruction of patient accidents reveals the banality and triviality
behind most catastrophes” (p. 9). Perrow describes the difference between
“transformation” process and “additive” process. He notes, “Transformation
systems are those where we cannot see what is going on; we generally know
what works but not necessarily why. These systems are vulnerable to small
failures that propagate unexpectedly because of complexity and tight coupling”
(Perrow, 1999, p. 10).
One of the lessons of complex systems theory is that any part of the
system might be interacting with other parts in unanticipated ways (Perrow, 1999,
p. 21). It is the unexpected interactions of a small failure in the system that
makes it prone to a system accident (Perrow, 1999, p. 61) which he defined as
an unintended and untoward event. Complex interactions suggest that there are
branching paths, feedback loops, jumps from one linear sequence to another
because of proximity. The connections are not only adjacent and serial, but can
multiply as other parts, units, or subsystems are reached. Only 1% of all
possible parts or units in a linear system are capable of producing complex
interactions, while 10% of those in a complex system are capable of doing so,
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that 10% represents more than a tenfold increase in the potential for system
accidents (Perrow, 75).
Perrow specifically defines linear interactions as those in expected and
familiar production or sequence and those that are visible even if unplanned.
Complex interactions are those of unfamiliar sequences of unplanned,
unexpected sequences and are not visible or not immediately comprehensible
(Perrow, 1999, p. 78).
The transformation process is a change in physical state and is often
discovered through trial and error. Generally it refers to systems that transform
raw materials, rather than fabricate or assemble parts of a system. Recombinant
DNA technology, nuclear technology, and chemical plants involve transformation
processes. Complex systems are described as systems with the characteristics
noted in Table 2.
Table 2. Perrow’s System Characteristics
− Proximity of parts or units not in a production sequence;
− Many common mode connections between components not in a production
sequence;
− Unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops;
− Many control parameters with potential interactions;
− Indirect or inferential information sources;
− Limited understanding of some processes.
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The characteristics in Table 2 (Perrow, 1999, p. 85-86) describe modern
healthcare. The interactions and interconnectivity of subsystems within the
human body do not always act as one would predict. The use of pharmacology
to treat the human conditions is known to work but not always clearly understood
as to how it works. Even more complex than the human body, which works in
harmony, the care systems in hospitals are complex with many connections
between medications, procedures, and patients and providers with varying
interests. There are innumerable interactions not in a production sequence and
with unintended feedback loops. Medical errors are a consequence of this
complexity and our limited understanding of how all the subsystems interconnect.
I believe, these new systems are an outgrowth of our sophistication in
designing more effective and efficient systems. Patients used to stay in the
hospital 10 days on average. Now it is 4 – 5 days because we simultaneously
treat their multiple conditions rather than sequentially treating and observing their
healing process related to the treatment interventions. In our effort to increase
our efficiency (less time) and effectiveness (better results) we have created
unintended interactions and consequences as we simultaneously medicate and
perform invasive procedures.
A more frightening yet exciting technology such as gene splicing has high
risk. Scientists use enzymes to cut DNA into pieces and recombine the pieces
with the DNA of a carrier or a vector. The recombined molecules are inserted
into a host where they reproduce. One benefit is that human growth factors that
were carried by a host bacteria could help treat children with growth disorders.
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The concern arises when the unrestrained application of these techniques is
considered. That is to say, the creation of a bacterial or viral vector that helps in
one set of circumstances, could also be devastating if that vector creates an
unexpected reaction and replicates beyond the scope of the original treatment. A
viral, uncontrollable vector carrying growth factors could create a potent, lethal
organism that potentially could be carcinogenic to humans. This is dangerous
technology with tremendous opportunity to help patients; yet the uncertainty of
understanding every mechanism involved in transformational, complex systems
can result in accidents (Perrow, 1999, p. 297).
Diane Vaughan (1996) agrees with Perrow that there are inherent hazards
in complex systems. She notes that our incremental approach to systems design
creates an environment where signs of potential danger can be normalized and
therefore, can have a catastrophic effect (Vaughan, 1996, p. XIV). She agrees
that engineering designs are often biased toward optimizing existing hardware to
“make them” work as opposed to designing something new based on what is
desired. Safety is a concern. Yet, many new designs bring new uncertainties,
not greater predictability. As argued in systems theory and supported by my
experience in hospitals, a change introduced in one part of a system may have
unpredictable ramifications for other parts (Vaughan, 1996, p. 116).
Frederick Taylor’s work introduced scientific management into the
workplace in the early 20th century. Taylor believed that “separation of
conception from execution” created more innovative and efficient designs
(Taylor, 1911, pg. 26). Workers lost control over their craft when planning
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responsibilities were taken from the individual worker and shifted to managers,
leaving the worker to follow orders. Managers were implementing plans without
access to the full picture (Vaughan, 1996, p. 204).
In our efforts to achieve sophistication, we created divisions of specialized
labor. This obfuscates individual responsibility for the overall product and
creates discontinuities. Many people make decisions but they do not know how
their actions connect to the actions of others or to the whole. The Challenger
catastrophe on January 28, 1986 exemplified the inherent danger in
incrementalism and discontinuity. A series of seemingly harmless decisions
moved NASA toward a disastrous outcome on February 1, 2003 when the Space
Shuttle Columbia exploded on re-entry (Vaughan, 1996, p. 408 – 409). These
tragedies are examples of “system accidents” - multiple failures in interconnected
subsystems.
The question is: how do we make systems in healthcare safer, reduce the
risk of accidents occurring while offering advances in care? One challenge is to
manage the complexities. Healthcare and, in particular, hospitals, are systems of
care that have been incrementally designed. We change components of the
system but we seldom redesign the process from start to finish. Incrementalism
is inherent in healthcare because medicine is evidence based. Physicians are
scientists who try new procedures or medicines and measure the effectiveness of
the intervention. This is best measured by controlling for one change at a time
so that results can be attributed to an intervention. This is an incremental
process. In healthcare, we build upon what we know, what we have experience
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with. The goal in systems design is to understand the connections and
interactions between the parts with more predictive capabilities and to de-couple
the process enough to build in safety.
The airline industry has accomplished this, and we can learn from them.
The principle of high reliability training is part of the key to the airlines’ success in
safety improvements. High reliability teams work together under the auspices
that anyone can challenge anyone and question anything if they believe safety
would be impacted. This creates an environment where all participants are
trained to observe small system failures that, if unnoticed, could cascade into
larger failures or accidents. Each team member observes the system from their
perspective. These multiple observers work together to intervene to stop errors
or accidents from becoming catastrophes.
High reliability organizations proffer, according to Vaughn (1996), safety
as a priority, decentralized decision making, enabling quick, flexible responses;
intense discipline and training that maximizes uniform appropriate responses by
those closest to the risk technology (p. 416). At the core of organizational
problems are people who need to make decisions or judgments every day. We
use our own mental models that reflect and are congruent with our experience
(Perrow, 1999, p. 27).
Probably the best example of an industry that has created systems and
teams that foster safety is the airline industry. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) is responsible for safety and facilitating air travel. The
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), an independent board, conducts
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investigations and prods the FAA to set new safety requirements. The Airline
Pilots Association (ALPA) is a strong union that advocates for safe conditions
and protests unsafe conditions. Although this structure provides for a strong
emphasis on safety, the real advance came in 1975 when the Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS) was established by the FAA and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). NASA supervises the system as
an independent entity. The system guarantees immunity. No reporters can be
penalized by the FAA even if they break federal laws (unless criminal activity is
involved). Reports are de-identified usually in less than 4 days after an accident.
Although pilots are still subject to discipline by their airlines, this kind of system
seems to work. Reports abound and unsafe conditions are quickly corrected
(Perrow, 1999, p. 169). This system incentivizes safety. These kinds of complex
regulatory endeavors create a complex web of safety nets.
In contrast to the “safety focused” airline industry, the marine industry is
characterized as an “error-inducing system”, where risky behavior is often
attributed to the “traditions of the sea.” Errors in the marine industry are coproduced by several factors (see Table 3).
Table 3. Marine Industry Characteristics
−

Centralized hierarchy headed by the captain;

−

Long hours on duty;

−

Insurance rates not tied to safety;

−

Communication problems – native languages can differ between officers and crews;

−

Crews rotate with each voyage with no incentive to maintain equipment;

−

Nature rules with storms, waves, ice-covered decks, shifting narrow channels and fog (Perrow, 1999,
p. 175).
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The authoritarian structure aboard a ship is inappropriate for the complexities of
today’s sophisticated ships.
Medicine probably lies somewhere in between the airline industry and the
marine industry in its culture of safety. Fundamentally, safety needs to be
embedded in the culture of organizations. It needs to be part of learned
behaviors, part of the value system, and generally a way of life. It needs to be
ever present, permeating all that one does.
Healthcare has always been committed to safety because of the nature of
the work, and because outcomes are often measured in mortality and morbidity.
Mistakes are a normal occurrence in any work. Healthcare is no different. Every
occupation has its mistake calculus, which is the probability of making a mistake
and this depends on many factors including skills, frequency of performance, and
the nature of the task. Medical work requires risky decision making in a complex
system for which failure has consequences for human life. Marianna Paget
(1988) in her book Unity of Mistakes, characterizes medical work as an activity
that is exceptional, uncommon, and strange because it is error-ridden, uncertain,
and practiced on the human body.
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CHAPTER 3
HEALTHCARE
With the complexity and coupling of our increasingly sophisticated
processes and technologies, small errors can cascade into catastrophes before
we can anticipate or even see the error unfold. The challenge for healthcare
systems and medical providers is to not only create greater safety through more
in-depth understanding of the multiplicity of interactions in the care process but,
more important, to design safety prospectively into the care process.
Hospitals are the most visible sector of the healthcare system in the
United States. There are 5,000 acute care hospitals in this country, and these
institutions play a central role in their communities. Like schools, religious
organizations, and governmental agencies, hospitals are part of the infrastructure
that interconnect communities. Doctors, nurses, and others provide care in
ambulatory settings, but hospitals remain the focal point for the most complex,
sophisticated, and innovative care. Hospitals are communities of people that
bring together a broad range of workers organized to support the complexities of
the 21st century care process. Both the technological side of care, referred to as
“high tech” and the human side of care, called “high touch” are part of this
enormously complex system of care. How do these high tech, high touch
forces/elements contribute to safer care?
Since 1999, there has been a great deal of inquiry and study into the
causes of medical error. In the 1990s, a series of sentinel events occurred and
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thoughtful studies emerged (see Table 1), culminating in the IOM’s report To Err
is Human – Building a Safer Health System.
Across the U.S., this report was seen as a call to action. I have observed
that our hospital is deeply committed to introspective review of our systems and a
prioritization of patient safety as the leading edge of quality. I believe the
commitment to quality has been the most important contribution modern
hospitals have made to medicine. In 2000, patient safety became the focus of
quality. In 2001, the IOM issued a second landmark report, Crossing the Quality
Chasm. This report was another call for action to improve the U.S. healthcare
delivery system as a whole, in all its quality dimensions, for all citizens.
Physician groups, hospitals, and other healthcare organizations operate
independently, often providing care without the benefit of complete information
about the patient’s condition, medical history, services provided in other settings,
or medications prescribed by other clinicians. The report concluded that the
current care systems could not adequately do the job. The linear approach to
incremental changes as the method for improvement in efficiency and
effectiveness was not working. Trying harder would not work. Redesign of the
systems of care was what was needed to create an advanced, sophisticated,
effective and efficient healthcare system for all U.S. citizens.
The IOM (2001) report, Crossing the Quality Chasm continued the IOM’s
focus on systems improvement. The breadth of recommendations spanned the
“high tech” realm (evidence-based decision making) to the “high touch” realm
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(care based on continuous healing relationships). The bar was raised again for
health care providers.
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CHAPTER 4
HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS /
HIGH RELIABILITY SYSTEMS DESIGNS
The healthcare industry, hospitals and doctors, responded to the IOM
Report by beginning to educate themselves about the systems of care, and how
redesign could improve safety and quality and approaches to managing risk and
designs for safety. Economic pressures in the 1990s had taken much of the
buffer out of the healthcare system. Hospitals consolidated into large systems.
Hundreds of beds were reduced or redistributed to create greater efficiency, and
redundancies in service offerings were eliminated or significantly diminished.
The move to a more efficient model took the slack out of the system. Hospital
departments had been compartmentalized which created some redundancy, and
as those excesses were reduced, the system of care became more tightly
coupled. The concept of “going solid” occurs when all units are filled and an
even minor event in one unit may have a major effect on another unit. Without
the simplicity and buffering of loose coupling, the system becomes brittle and
difficult to manage. Accidents are more likely, more difficult to foresee, and
harder to recover from (Cook, Rasmussen, 2005, p. 3). “Going solid” creates
pressure, and practitioners push beyond the limits of the marginal boundary
towards the unacceptable performance boundary. Organizations that operate
beyond the marginal boundary are “flirting with the margin, which can lead to
incremental adjustment of the marginal boundary outward. Relatively fixed
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marginal boundaries and deliberately restricted operating point dynamics are the
hallmark of high reliability organizations (HROs)” (Cook, Rasmussen, 2005, p. 3).
HROs are characterized by advanced technology requiring specialist
understanding and high degrees of interdependence requiring generalist
understanding. In complex, tightly coupled processes, tight coordination and
control enhances performance reliability. One very important strategy for
reducing the negative effects of complexity and coupling is redundancy.
According to Roberts (1990), “if things are done quickly, many pairs of eyes
serve as watchdogs, the many pairs of eyes are a substitute for unavailable time.
In short, three pairs of eyes should be able to spot a problem that may take one
pair of eyes longer to detect” (Roberts, 1990, p. 168).
Understanding models of safety has become key to advancing a culture of
safety in hospitals. Proper resources and continuous re-evaluation of the most
effective use of resources is essential. Healthy levels of redundancy or safety
nets absent wasteful duplication is essential for reliable, safe systems of care.
The balance between redundant safety nets and wasteful duplication is one of
the most vexing issues for hospital leadership. How to deploy limited resources
in the most effective proportions is an ongoing challenge.
The concepts of reliability and systems designed for appropriate
redundancy that create safety nets to protect patients from errors is the
fundamental premise that contemporary providers use in creating a culture of
safety.
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James Reason developed the Swiss Cheese Model in 1991 and many
authors have modified the concept to describe system errors. R. I. Cook (2005)
has used the concept to articulate goal conflicts, defenses, and latent failures
(see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Cook’s Model

Figure 1 presents how a series of slips or misses due to various pressures
can lead to a system failure. In systems there are co-producing forces that
cause system failure. It is the culmination and the sequence of slips that
ultimately results in an accident. Embedded in this model is the understanding
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that in a tightly coupled work process errors can compound quickly before they
can be understood so that a failure can be avoided or prevented. A review of
system failures produces hindsight bias. (See Figure 2). The source of error is
clear after it has occurred but not as it is unfolding, otherwise we would interdict
the process and prevent the error.
Figure 2. Hindsight Bias

At AMH, most of our study of errors revolves around a retrospective
understanding of incidents and redesign of systems to prevent error or system
failure, but we have also moved to prospective review and design of new
programs, procedures, or processes. We use the Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) approach (Cohen, pg. 319). This has proved to be extremely
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effective in understanding the flaws or weaknesses in our processes before
patients are treated. This time consuming process serves as a laboratory for
study and practice such as simulation and creates a safer process in advance of
actual implementation.
Another very important concept in systems design for high reliability is that
of “The Sharp End and The Blunt End.” Traditionally, the care process was the
purview of the practitioner. Leadership, administration, and support services
managed the overall operation and dealt with the physical assets, coordination of
all work, and support of the caregivers (see Figure 3). The sharp end is where
the care is rendered by practitioners. The blunt end is where resources and
constraints are generated. Careful coordination between the two ends is
essential in a culture of safety (Cook and Woods, 1994). The blunt end must
support the providers in the design and resourcing of safe care processes,
whether that involves training, education, staffing, technology, information
systems, equipment, space, and emotional support.
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Figure 3. The Sharp End and The Blunt End

AMH has worked very hard to create a culture where we are all
responsible for safety. We play different roles but patient safety remains our
stated primary priority, a core value for our entire organization – the Board of
Trustees, the medical staff, leadership, our employees, and all the “stakeholders”
who interact with our hospital are consequently part of the complexity problem.
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CHAPTER 5
CULTURE OF SAFETY
In this section I describe AMH’s journey to create a culture of safety, a
journey that will never end but has had progressive successes to date.
After the publication of the IOM Report (1999), AMH rededicated itself to
patient safety. We believed we had always been committed to creating a
clinically safe environment for our patients, but the IOM Report was clearly a call
to action. It all started with our CEO. He clearly articulated a vision for our
hospital, a vision of a safer institution. He set the stage for what would be our
journey to create a culture of safety. We developed a Patient Safety Oversight
Peer Review Committee (PSOC) in December 1999. The committee was
charged with two goals. First, to establish a systems approach to improving
patient care and reducing medical errors beyond the existing performance
improvement program; and second, to gather and review information for the
purposes of evaluating and improving the quality of healthcare rendered through
improved patient safety with the ultimate goal of reducing morbidity and mortality.
The PSOC was comprised of all of the elected leadership of the medical
staff, the officers; all of the appointed leadership of the medical staff, the
department chairs; hospital administration; nursing administration; the directors
of risk management, performance improvement, clinical information, information
systems, medical education, and pharmacy; and a trustee. The committee was
co-chaired by the Chief of Staff (COS) and the Executive Vice President (COO).
A subcommittee, the Patient Safety Committee (PSC), was established to

24
provide for greater study and implementation of the Oversight Committee’s goals
and objectives. It became evident early on that a Chief Patient Safety Officer
(CSO) was needed so the Chairman of Medicine who also chaired the Pharmacy
and Therapeutics Committee, assumed the role of CSO.
Our first goal was to consider the appropriate design and use of
technology to achieve greater safety. The literature was clear: universal
(mandatory) Computerized Physician Order Entry (CPOE) could reduce
medication errors by 55% - 83% (Bates, 2007, p. 3). Some of the medical staff
(40%) used the computer system to enter their orders but the majority (60%) did
not. Almost all of the residents (90%) used the computer to enter orders. We set
a goal in January 2000 to achieve universal CPOE by January 2001. The entire
medical staff, nursing staff, and information systems staff moved into active
implementation. There was a clear sense of momentum in the organization. To
a person there was a strong drive to accelerate our efforts to achieve the central
goal of universal CPOE. The CSO engaged the medical staff to accept the
values and outcomes. Many physician opinion leaders, especially the Chief of
Staff, championed the cause. The potential benefits were overwhelming: 70%
reduction in medication errors. In a hospital with over 40,000 admissions,
100,000 emergency room visits, 5,200 births and millions of medication doses
per year, the potential impact of CPOE on patient safety was tremendous.
Constant communication and measurement of milestones towards
achieving the goal were instrumental in building peer pressure to bring all
physicians on board. Our Patient Safety Newsletter served as the central
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communiqué on techniques that were being employed and resources that were
available to help and train physicians on the clinical computer system.
It took a year of intense focus to achieve this goal. The COS and CSO
applied continuous peer pressure to capture the attention of every member of the
medical staff. Individual meetings, extensive sharing of comparative data about
who was using the computer for order entry and who was not, and personal
training and attention was afforded the medical staff by nursing and information
systems. “Super users” were available on the nursing units to give physicians
personal tutorials. Our CSO wrote personal letters to physicians to articulate the
value and importance of CPOE for patient safety. By January 2001, we had
achieved our goal. Although much time and effort was spent convincing
physicians CPOE was valuable and important for patient safety, there was a
clear mandate that all physicians needed to place all of their orders via the
computer when they were in the hospital. The computer was used for 85% of all
orders and for 99% of medication orders. This was the best we could hope for
until our web-enabled technology was installed in 2007 and physicians could
enter orders into the computer from their homes or their offices. Accomplishment
of this goal was a huge success for Abington Memorial Hospital. Only 5% of the
hospitals in the country had universal, mandatory CPOE in 2001 and less than
10% have it today in 2010. With over 85% of our orders placed directly in the
computer by the ordering physician, we moved our hospital to a higher level of
safety.
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Once we accomplished universal CPOE, we realized the power of this
automation as a patient safety tool. We proceeded to contract with Eclipsys, a
software vendor, for their full suite of products to ensure full integration of all our
systems. Our analysis indicated their clinical system was the most sophisticated
software for patient safety on the market in 2000. Warnings and alerts created a
safety net for patients and providers. Critical lab values would automatically
notify the attending physician. Lab data or drug interactions would appear on the
computer screen as the physician was placing his/her orders. Evidence-based
medicine protocols and templates could be automated to guide clinicians. The
Clinical Alert and Decision Support system was originally developed at the
Brigham and Women’s Hospital in the 1990’s. CPOE was an internally focused
project for AMH. We capitalized on our commitment to quality of care. We
needed to make it happen, and we did.
Our next major endeavor was to learn from the experts. In 2000, we
invited the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) into our hospital to
review all of our medication processes. They spent three days with us and
produced a thorough review of opportunities for improvement. We spent the next
three years methodically and meticulously implementing the ISMP redesign
recommendations. As an authority on medication safety, we distribute the ISMP
newsletters, which contain the most current research on pharmaceutical and
medication devices safety to medical staff members and distribute their nursing
newsletter to our nurses. We are preparing to distribute the consumer newsletter
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to our patients. We review our current systems based on the ISMP studies to
identify needed system changes.
As we came to know the ISMP, we recognized what a truly remarkable
organization it was. Our CSO served as a surveyor for them and our COO was
appointed to the ISMP Board. We remain committed to learning from the
experts.
Our next major advance in patient safety was to begin to participate in
every relevant learning collaborative that we could at the local, state, and even
national level. We worked with the Healthcare Improvement Foundation (HCIF),
a collaborative of the Delaware Valley Healthcare Council in Southeastern
Pennsylvania, and the ISMP, on medication safety. We worked with the Hospital
Association of Pennsylvania’s Patient Safety Collaborative. We worked with the
Voluntary Hospitals of America Patient Safety Clinical Advantage Program. We
organized teams, sent representatives, and tried to learn everything we could to
enhance our knowledge of patient safety and to share whatever knowledge we
had. Our CPOE success was of great interest to other hospitals. This was all
part of our research initiative in our journey to create a culture of safety.
During this phase in our development, we voluntarily participated in all
reporting programs that were available to us – MedMARX for medication errors,
MERIT for medication and medical errors, as well as the State of Pennsylvania
Act 51 Reporting of Sentinel Events, and State of Pennsylvania Act 13 for
reporting of all types of events, those that have caused harm as well as those
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with the potential to cause harm to patients. We educated our staff about the
need to report so that we could redesign systems flaws and prevent future errors.
We could only correct systems that we discussed and agreed needed to
be changed. We modified our incident report form and created a Safety
Assurance Form changing the intonation of reporting. This produced a doubling
in reporting of our “no harm” incidents (those that could have caused harm but
did not) which allowed us to change systems before errors occurred. As we
talked more openly about specific errors, reporting all sentinel or significant
events to our trustees, we all became more comfortable focusing on systems
improvement and not individual blame. This was one of our most difficult
challenges. As with many organizations, we tend to focus on parts and are
defensive about errors which leads us to blame causes on one aberrant
individual. We emphasized that we were committed to moving away from the
traditional linear analytic thinking approach of finding the weakest link that
caused the error in the process of care. That weakest link could have been a
piece of equipment or it could have been a person. As we moved beyond blame
and beyond the person, we came to understand our problems as systemic and
as having many co-producing, interacting causes. To formalize our commitment
to redesigning systems not focusing on people, we developed a Culture of Safety
Policy which articulated our transition to a deeper understanding of the coproduced causes of error. This new framework of thinking required greater, indepth study into how errors occur.
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The more we studied, the more complex the care process appeared. One
segment of work was inextricably tied to other sequences of work. The concept
of coupling became more evident. The combination of complexity and coupling
can be fertile ground for small errors to cascade into a catastrophe before we can
see the error unfolding.
James Reason’s (2008) Swiss Cheese Theory illustrates a model of
medical errors: one small error after another can snowball into a tragic accident.
Our goal was to create nets of safety throughout our processes to prevent small
errors from accumulating into sentinel events that cause real harm to patients.
Education of all clinical employees and the medical staff was important to
identification of near misses, accidents waiting to happen. When the staff caught
a minor error before it evolved into a serious error, reporting was usually lacking
because there was no evidence of harm to the patient.
These incidents are fertile ground for system management. We
encouraged the staff to report anything that not only caused harm to a patient but
could have caused harm to patients. Thanking and even celebrating staff who
took the time to report issues was one way to encourage more reporting. We
located Patient Safety Suggestion Boxes where anyone could report any issue
anonymously all over the hospital and on our ambulatory campuses. Employees
began to share ideas. Our relentless focus on patient safety reporting system
changes led to people at all levels becoming more aware of patient safety and
many began to understand their role in making our hospital one of the safest in
the country.
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Our first priority was to change the framework of thinking about patient
safety. Beginning in July 2000, every employee received a copy of our annual
goals, and each year they would see patient safety as the number one priority.
We established an Employee Patient Safety Committee. This committee evolved
into a robust, energized group of patient safety liaisons, one from each nursing
unit and each clinical department. They were interested, excited, open-minded,
and would soon feel empowered. Along with their department managers they
were the patient safety “go to” person for their work unit. They would share
information and educate staff as well as absorb information and transmit data to
those who needed to allocate resources to correct systems. They were catalysts
for change. The CSO chaired the group with one of our nursing directors and
several senior managers were part of this group so we could support their needs,
reinforce the importance of their role, and hopefully unleash the grassroots
energy to create safety awareness at all times.
Almost two years into our exploration of patient safety as our number one
focus, we were accumulating so much data, information, issues, comments, and
extramural directives and newsletters such as ISMP publications, that we needed
a better way to prioritize and assimilate the opportunities for improvement. Our
Vice President for Professional Services took responsibility for organizing all
sources of input into an “Integrated Patient Safety Summary Report.” This report
would serve as our working document for all sources of patient safety
opportunities. The report tracked each stage of every issue: identification,
further study needed, team assembled and finally, stages of implementation.
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Each issue was assigned, tracked and implemented. Issue after issue was
addressed. This was a focused effort to transform ideas and suggestions into
work routines. This was where the system changes came to life. A diligent
group of professionals from performance assessment, nursing, medical staff and
administration were dedicated and committed to making our hospital one of the
safest in the country. The Vice President for Professional Services, CSO and
Directors of Nursing provided exemplary leadership and drive.
As we continued to try to engage all employees and medical staff to
become involved, we developed and distributed an AMH Patient Safety
Handbook to all employees. The handbook described our culture of safety and
our reporting and disclosure philosophy. Each employee was required to read
the handbook and sign off that they understood the contents. A Patient Safety
Plan was developed and distributed to all members of the medical staff
requesting a signed acknowledgement of their support of the plan. A Patient
Safety Award was developed that was to be given to individuals who advanced
patient safety at AMH.
Patient safety awareness was enhanced through distribution of a “Safety
First” pin to those involved on the various patient safety committees. A poster
board display placed in the hospital lobby illustrating patient safety
accomplishments at AMH further illustrated our commitment to advancing patient
safety.
In the late fall of 2002, we entered a new phase in our development. We
won the Delaware Valley Healthcare Council’s first Medication Safety Award for
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our automated inpatient coumadin management and monitoring program. This
recognition by our peer hospitals in Southeastern Pennsylvania was particularly
meaningful and spurred us on. At the annual Eclipsys meeting, we won the
Stellar Award for our work in implementing the Eclipsys clinical system that took
our automation of safety through CPOE to a new level with the sophistication of
the Eclipsys software. Both of these honors pushed us to merge these two
initiatives to develop a virtual coumadin clinic, a web-based coumadin
management program for our network of owned physician practices. We had
begun to tap the talent within our clinical ranks. One of our very gifted clinicians
created the software to merge our inpatient coumadin management program and
the web-enabled Eclipsys system to take safety into the ambulatory setting.
Within six months, 70% of our patients were within the therapeutic range up from
40% prior to automating the monitoring. For this innovative use of technology to
support clinicians monitoring patients on coumadin in the ambulatory setting, we
were recognized as a finalist for the 2003 VHA Leadership Award for Clinical
Effectiveness for a Single Hospital, and we were awarded the very prestigious,
2003 John M. Eisenberg Award for Systems Innovation from The Joint
Commission and National Quality Forum.
We wanted to ensure that we could bring evidence based medicine to our
clinicians and used the literature to guide our processes of care. Medication
ordering patterns were modified to create forcing functions not allowing
physicians to order medications within a certain period of time after ordering
other medications. Pharmacists ordered lab tests to ensure appropriate levels of
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a drug. We provided handheld devices with medical literature reference software
to all of our residents.
Always focusing on the handoffs (coupling interactions) from one provider
to another we looked more carefully at the continuum of care that we were part
of. As an institution with over 3,000 admissions from skilled nursing facilities
(SNF) we needed a better tool to perfect the continuum of care from the hospital
back into the SNFs. A universal computerized transfer and discharge summary
was developed that built on our commitment to eliminate errors caused by poor
penmanship.
We developed a system to fax all discharge instructions to primary care
physicians to enhance communications and continuity of care. Our inpatient
nurses developed a program where unit nurses called all discharged patients at
home 2-3 days after discharge to follow up with patients regarding discharge
instructions and medications.
About this time, we also began to use tools from other initiatives that were
designed to modify our culture to improve services. We merged our welldeveloped patient satisfaction survey process with patient safety. We inserted a
separate survey in our patient satisfaction survey and we collated those results
ourselves. The questions queried patients on proper patient identification before
every interaction, explanation of medications, and overall assessment of safety
from the patient’s perspective. The results were tabulated by nursing unit and
distributed to all units. This was another tool to assess our effectiveness and to
engage patients in the safety of their care.
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One of our most intriguing initiatives grew out of the professional liability
crisis in Pennsylvania. The Pew Charitable Trusts funded “The Project on
Medical Liability in Pennsylvania.” One aspect of the Project involved
communication between caregivers and patients and their families.
We were invited to participate with three other hospitals in a Pew study on
the “Effectiveness of Mediation as a Means of Resolving Disputes and Disclosing
Errors.” This study holds great promise as a methodology for understanding and
communicating errors to patients, families, and hospital staff. After disclosing,
apologizing, and explaining an error to a patient or family, mediation can provide
a means for each party to express what they believe and/or need, and to help
everyone to move on from the unfortunate situation. The process of open
discussion helps both sides to better deal with their sorrow, anger, and
frustration. In a particularly litigious state like Pennsylvania, this project was
particularly challenging. To date, we have had many successful mediation
interventions.
As we entered calendar year 2003, we once again tried to push ourselves
to achieve a higher level of effectiveness. We worked with the VHA to implement
team training for staff in our obstetrical units and in our Emergency Room. The
IOM Report Crossing the Quality Chasm, spoke to the importance of effective
teamwork and communication among the care team. This training was designed
to ensure better teamwork in these high-risk services. Our CSO became our
Chief of Staff. He and our CNO have role modeled a powerful partnership
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between physicians and nurses training and rendering care to patients as a
team.
In 2003, we were very proud to be nominated one of five finalists for the
American Hospital Association’s (AHA) newly established Quest for Quality
Prize. This qualified us for a site visit from the AHA Quest for Quality Prize
Survey Team. This prize is given to the institution that most effectively
demonstrates a culture of safety throughout the organization. We rarely look
forward to surveys but we were genuinely excited about this visit and you could
sense our enthusiasm and energy for patient safety as we opened our institution
to the Quality Prize Team. We were deeply honored when we were notified that
we had been selected as the 2003 winner of the AHA Quest for Quality Prize.
This award validated our efforts. Our passion for patient safety was discernable
and readily evident to the reviewers.
In 2004, our hospital began a very important journey toward nursing
excellence and empowerment, the Magnet Journey. The American Nurses
Credentialing Center (ANCC) is the premier nursing credentialing organization in
the world. They review and study hospitals across the country to try to identify
why certain hospitals produced better, safer care, and lower nursing staff
turnover rates. The nursing shortage had become acute in the early 2000s and
nursing and hospital leaders were looking for strategies to improve their
organizations’ ability to care for a growing and aging population.
The ANCC identified 14 qualities that could be attributed to successful
nursing departments, and these successful departments were, in turn, part of
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successful hospitals. These qualities were identified as the Forces of Magnetism
(see Table 4).
Table 4. Forces of Magnetism
Quality of Nursing Leadership
Organizational Structure
Management Style
Personnel Policies and Programs
Professional Models of Care
Quality of Care
Quality Improvement
Consultant and Resources
Autonomy
Community and the Healthcare Organization
Nurses as Teachers
Image of Nursing
Interdisciplinary Relationships
Professional Development

Magnet standards speak to excellence and quality in the care of patients.
Magnet creates a learning environment, seeks community involvement and most
importantly, empowers nurses in their role as the primary caregivers for patients
in a hospital. This empowerment was an important component of our journey to
create a culture of safety. Nurses prided themselves on the care they provided
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and were responsible for articulating issues that comprised safety and quality.
They also knew they would be supported by both nursing leadership and
physician leadership if their challenges or questions were in the name of safety.
In 2005, AMH was awarded Magnet accreditation. We were the 84th
hospital in the country and fourth in the State of Pennsylvania to achieve this
important milestone. We were just reaccredited in 2008. There are currently just
over 300 Magnet hospitals in the United States and just under 400 globally.
In our pursuit of safety, our nursing information system team came up with
a very simple but elegant solution to a very vexing problem: how to effectively
communicate to patients and their families about all of the tests, medications,
and consultants that are scheduled for them during their hospital stay. The
Patient Daily Summary (Appendix 1) was developed by pulling data from various
parts of our electronic health record to create a daily schedule of all activities the
patient can expect. It is printed, handed to the patient and the patient’s nurse
discusses the content and answers questions. The summary includes a brief
explanation of medications and each test or procedure, including what is involved
and the purpose of the test. Family members can review the summary when
they visit. The use by the staff of this very simple document and the engagement
of the patient and family has proven to be a very important communication tool
for patients and encourages questions from patients and their families. Our
nursing information system team felt empowered to find solutions to our
communication issues. AMH enabled these employees with grant funding from
our Innovator’s Circle Program to test their ideas and create a prototype of their
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Daily Care Plan and to pilot it with patients and families. It proved to be helpful
based on feedback from our patients and we then implemented the plan across
all nursing units for all inpatients. Once a year the American Nurses
Credentialing Center (ANCC) awards the Magnet Prize to one organization for an
innovative approach to better, safer care. In 2008, AMH was awarded the
Magnet Prize for our Daily Care Plan. This was a very special recognition for our
organization and particularly for our nurses and our clinical information systems
team. The Magnet Prize recognized the strength and depth of excellence and
commitment to safety in our nursing service.
In December 2004, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement introduced its
two-year, 100,000 Lives Campaign with a goal of reducing unnecessary hospital
deaths by 100,000 by June 2006. In 2005, AMH joined the campaign with
individual nurse champions leading each of the six teams supported by a
physician champion to implement the best practices. We worked diligently to
change our care practices and have seen significant improvements after
implementing these practices (see Table 5).
Table 5. IHI 100,000 Lives Campaign
Rapid Response Team (MET Team)
Preventing adverse drug events
Delivering evidence based care for acute MI (heart attack)
Preventing ventilator associated pneumonia
Preventing central line infections
Preventing surgical site infections.
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One of the most important factors in our adoption of these six best practices was
widespread education for and commitment from the medical, nursing, and clinical
ancillary staffs. Our Chairman of the Board in 2005 was and remains a strong
proponent of patient safety. He is also a very generous philanthropist, a retired
CEO of his family’s very successful business. He challenged the administrative,
medical, and nursing leadership to create a safer environment, and he offered to
fund a small team of leaders, trustees and clinical staff to attend the IHI annual
conference and to bring back and share information with their colleagues.
When the second two-year IHI campaign, 5 Million Lives, was introduced
in 2006 our Board Chair again provided funding but this time 30 people were able
to attend the annual IHI conference. One of those attendees was the prior Chair
of the Board who had also served as Vice Chair of the Board. She had served in
many leadership capacities at the hospital and was an early patient safety and
quality champion chairing or serving on every safety and quality committee in the
hospital. She and the Board Chair provided exemplary leadership in our patient
safety efforts. They truly exemplified the values of the 5 Million Lives initiative of
getting the Board on Board. Our strong presence at the IHI annual meeting has
created many more patient safety advocates for these very important behavioral
process changes. Every year since, this same generous and very committed
patient safety advocate has funded 30-35 AMH staff and trustees to attend the
IHI annual conference. He moved patient safety to the front of his Board agenda
devoting 30 minutes to address a specific patient safety issue at the beginning of
every Board meeting. The collective experience so many of us at AMH have had
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at the IHI conference has truly embedded a culture of safety and the need for
appropriate attention and resource allocation to accomplish the daunting tasks
before us.
In 2006, our Board Chair spoke to one of his colleagues who was on the
Board of Miriam Hospital in Connecticut. Miriam Hospital had advanced the
aviation concept of Crew Resource Management, and so our Chair arranged for
a team of doctors to visit Miriam Hospital with him. We subsequently adopted a
similar model from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)
called Team Stepps. For the past three years, we have assiduously trained our
nursing staff, our residents, and our physicians. This two-day training teaches
the principles of clear and complete communication among the healthcare team.
Staff are empowered to ask questions when they have any concerns about the
care provided to patients. It has been a significant investment of time, energy,
and funding for the 3,200 individuals who have attended.
By 2006, we had accomplished significant training and education. We
communicated to all trustees, leaders, physicians, nurses, and staff that patient
safety was our number one priority. We now needed an organized structure for
implementation. We needed patient safety champions who could catalyze efforts
everywhere in our inpatient and outpatient hospital services and in our physician
practices. Safety needed to be ubiquitous and the challenge was so great that it
could not be handled in a centralized fashion. Everyone needed to be a patient
safety champion or at least knowledgeable about the best practices and
accountable for delivering safe care. What we needed was an organizing entity
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to structure our implementation agenda and enable effective execution of our
ambitious and overwhelming patient safety agenda.
We established the “Center for Patient Safety and Healthcare Quality”
(CSQ). We appointed two of our best and brightest clinicians who were also
educators and members of our faculty. Our Administrative Director was a clinical
nurse practitioner and our Medical Director was the Associate Director of our
Internal Medicine Residency Program and a practicing internist. One was highly
organized, gifted communicator and tactically capable of delivering a clinical work
product; the other was exceptionally creative and skilled at design of systems,
particularly information systems. Together, they synthesized energy, intellect
and creativity. We integrated processes and procedures related to quality and
safety and added new staff in an effort to coalesce our clinical safety and quality
resources in one department with a renewed commitment to accelerate our work
in creating a culture of safety. They have successfully gathered data, analyzed
our performance, introduced best practices, educated our physicians and staff
and held people accountable to our goals. They collaborate with staff and collate
data to keep everyone focused. With their help and guidance, we have created a
“no excuses” environment – patient safety is a core value and our number one
priority. Everyone is expected to be a positive force in our culture of safety. The
center has staffed and been the driving force behind root cause analyses of
serious safety events as we strive to retrospectively understand the system story
(what happened), the co-producing or interacting forces, and the resolution (how
can we prevent this from happening again). Even more impressive, however, is
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the work the CSQ has done with Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) and
proactive risk assessments. This is the prospective review, mapping and
analysis of what could happen, rather than the root cause analysis of what did
happen. FMEA is about preventing errors before a service is started or a new
procedure or device is introduced. It is painstaking work, but it is so important for
the prospective design of safe systems. The CSQ has over the last four years,
2006 – 2009, performed the activities presented in Figure 4.
Figure 4
Abington Memorial Hospital
Center for Healthcare Safety and Quality

AMH has engaged in an impressive array of very important work that requires
extreme effort but yields extraordinary results. To a person, every clinician
involved thought they knew what they wanted to do as they introduced a new
service or procedure, and to a person, they complemented the process indicating
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they learned so much in the process that better prepared them to care for their
patients safely.
A very important component of our safety journey has been to support
caregivers at the point of care with resources. The CSQ conducts patient safety
rounds where trustees, leadership and CSQ staff visit various units or
departments on all three shifts to meet with caregivers and discuss how they
care for patients and what unmet needs they may have. Purposeful patient
safety rounding includes asking the following questions of clinical staff:

 What worries you about care on your unit?
 What is the next accident that could happen on your unit?
 Tell me what is working well.
 If you could change something, what would it be, how would you do it and
why?

 Do you have the tools and equipment to do your job?
 Are there any individuals who should be recognized for their commitment to
safety?
The caregivers often tell stories about patients as they communicate new
processes or needs for change. This process fosters collaboration and
understanding between the blunt end of care (leadership/governance) and the
sharp end of care (clinical caregivers). It is management’s responsibility to
operationalize system changes to properly resource and organize safe patient
care services. Careful follow-up occurs after the rounds to insure reasonable
changes are implemented based on the caregivers’ input.
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In 2005, we had a very serious event where we mortally injured one of our
patients. We disclosed the tragic error to the patient’s wife and we offered
mediation as a formal way to bring closure for this family. The family decided to
donate their compensation to establish a patient safety lectureship at AMH. This
was an incredibly generous and proactive, positive gesture on the part of this
family in the face of their devastating loss. To this day, I believe they understood
the deep regret we had in failing to rescue their loved one. Our Chief of Staff
was the principal spokesperson for our hospital, and he has the ability to truly
communicate empathy and remorse and to frame the picture of well-meaning,
well-trained professionals working in a system that fails the patient. He knows
how to sincerely apologize. I suspect he aged a few years in those several
months of mediation. Reliving the death of a loved one or your patient can be
draining but it can also be a way to heal and hopefully allow people to move
forward after such a loss.
The patient safety lectureship provided a very public venue for AMH to
remember this patient and the family’s loss while educating our staff about how
to prevent errors through systems improvement. Our first speaker in 2005 was
Jeffrey Cooper, Ph.D. Each year we invite noted experts to educate us in a daylong series of lectures and rounds. We have been so fortunate to have hosted
several patient safety champions (see Table 6).
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Table 6. AMH Patient Safety Lecturers
Jeffrey Cooper, Ph.D.

2005

David Marx, J.D.

2006

Sorrel King

2007

Michael Leonard, MD

2008

Craig Clapper, P.E.

2009

Each speaker shared new dimensions of safety with us, whether through the
eyes of an anesthesiologist, biomedical engineer, systems engineer, lawyer, or
mother. Their depth of knowledge, commitment, diverse perspective, and
heartfelt drive creates a better system for providers to care for patients.
In 2006 David Marx described a “Just Culture” in his Primer for Healthcare
Executives. As we evolved as an organization seven years into our journey, we
recognized that we needed to instill a sense of individual accountability for our
actions while understanding systems theory and the impact system flaws can
have on a well meaning, attentive, informed practitioner in a complex, coupled
environment. We no longer used the term “blame-free.” There were times when
individuals would demonstrate reckless behavior. This required discipline and
we needed everyone to understand what our performance expectations were at
AMH.
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David Marx helped us to bridge the links between the four evils. First is
human error which refers to what we should have done other than what did. The
second is negligence, the failure to exercise expected care which refers to what
we should have been aware of substantial and unjustifiable risk. The third is
recklessness, the conscious disregard of substantial and unjustifiable risk. The
fourth is intentional rule violation or knowingly violating a rule or procedure (Marx
2001, pg. 12).
Mr. Marx also differentiated between the three disciplinary decisionmaking strategies. Outcome-Based Disciplinary Decision-Making concerns
much of our disciplinary decision making. If a nurse makes an error and causes
no harm, we consider her to be lucky. If another nurse commits the same error
resulting in injury, she is blameworthy (Marx, 2001, pg. 13). This system is
fundamentally flawed. We can only control our intended behaviors but not
always the outcome.
Rule-Based Disciplinary Decision Making involves high-risk industries
where individuals are expected to follow rules, policies and procedures.
Discipline can occur if one violates a rule. The FAA’s Aviation Safety Reporting
System incents pilots to report all errors. If reported, a pilot will not be disciplined
for inadvertent violations. The problem with rule-based disciplinary action is that
there will always be times where the rule does not fit circumstances the
professional is facing. Over time, people push the normative boundary of safe
practice. Violations of policy can be learning opportunities. In a disciplinary
model that takes action against intentional rule violation there will be little
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learning about why people violated the rule. Employees will, as a defensive
measure, report they thought they were following the rule (Marx 2001, pg. 15).
Rule-based discipline is also flawed if we truly want to create safe systems for
the future.
Risk-Based Disciplinary Decision-Making includes recklessness, a highcrime demonstrating greater intent than mere negligent conduct. Unjustifiable
risk should result in disciplinary action. Even in a learning, reporting culture,
reckless conduct is grounds for discipline as a deterrent to knowingly performing
unsafe acts. To develop an effective and robust reporting system employees
and physicians need to understand how the information will be handled: human
error should not be disciplined, intentional rule violation should not be disciplined,
reckless behavior should be disciplined, and for negligent behavior discipline
depends on the circumstances.
Was the person aware or unaware of risk they were creating – the former
may be cause for discipline and the latter should not be. The balance between
discipline to create deterrence and communication and enhanced reporting and
learning needs to be carefully weighed (Marx, 2001, pg. 16). The greater the
reporting, the greater the opportunity for learning. We at AMH have moved to
learning vs. discipline for negligent behavior.
In all of these disciplinary decision-making models, only reckless behavior
is cause for discipline at AMH. Repeat reckless behavior is cause for
termination.
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In 2007, we invited Sorrel King to be our patient safety lecturer. Ms. King
lost her daughter, Josie, when she was 18 months old. Josie was being treated
at Johns Hopkins Hospital for burns she received after accidentally stepping into
a scalding tub at home. Josie was responding well to treatment in the intensive
care unit. She was moved to an intermediate care unit and began to exhibit
unusual symptoms: sucking her washcloth, crying for every drink she saw.
Despite her mother’s expressions of concern, caregivers overlooked or
misinterpreted the child’s signs of dehydration. She was given a narcotic despite
the verbal order that she should receive no additional medications. Josie died in
2001, two days before she was expected to go home. Sorrel and her husband
were devastated by this seemingly senseless death of their daughter.
Consumed with grief and anger they decided to channel their energy into the
healthcare system. When Johns Hopkins Hospital offered a financial settlement
she asked them to take some of the money back to start a Children’s Safety
program, and she created the Josie King Foundation to fund safety initiatives in
other hospitals. To hear Ms. King retell the story of her daughter’s death and to
challenge hospital leadership about their role in patient safety was very powerful
for all of us at AMH. This was another call to action like the two watershed IOM
reports. This time it was not a think tank and years of research framing the
importance of safety in hospitals, it was a mother who knew her daughter was
struggling, no one listened to her and she lost her child.
Sorrel King believes it all comes back to communication. People did not
listen to her and they did not listen to each other. Sorrel King joined our patient
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safety rounds when she visited us in 2007. She later posted a piece on her
website. She was connecting the dots, reinforcing her message to us – It All
Comes Back to Communication (See Appendix B).
In 2008, we hosted Michael Leonard, MD at our patient safety lectureship.
Dr. Leonard is an anesthesiologist who is the Physician Director of Patient Safety
for Kaiser Permanente in Oakland, California. Dr. Leonard is an expert in
understanding the factors affecting clinicians in the care environment and a
strong advocate for communication and team work. Practicing medicine or
nursing is complex, stressful work. Team members support each other, help
each other and effective teams produce better outcomes. Multi-tasking, stress,
fatigue degrade professionals’ performance. Hospitals need to design
safeguards to these conditions that increase the risk of error.
Dr. Leonard advocates for briefings before an operating room procedure
and a debriefing after the procedure to communicate issues or concerns
prospectively in the briefing and ways to improve in the debriefing: what went
well, what was difficult, what we could have done differently, and what we
learned. This kind of level playing field creates an environment where everyone
in the operating room feels empowered to ask a question, contribute an idea, or
voice a concern. The results are impressive: more communication equals less
error, but the communication needs to be succinct and pertinent. SBAR
(Situation, Background, Assessment and Recommendation) is a way of
organizing the briefings or communiqués. Dr. Leonard offers this methodology
as an effective communication tool (Groff, 2003).
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Dr. Leonard impressed upon us the importance of these communication
techniques. Although we had instituted SBAR and briefings, we had not
hardwired it across our organization. It was not institutionalized. Our Center for
Safety and Quality began a rigorous educational program that included the use of
succinct educational briefings using the SBAR framework, which are routinely
emailed to our entire organization.
Nursing handoffs are conducted in the SBAR format. Unit briefings
(huddles) are required to be held twice a day on each unit. We have set a goal in
FY 10 of increasing our briefing compliance from our current rate of 67% to 85%.
Dr. Leonard is a very smart, practical, and succinct patient safety
advocate. He understands how things work and he has a very practical
approach to achieving breakthrough results. As an educator, he always circles
back to learnings and what can be retained by clinicians caring for patients. One
of the techniques being used in Kaiser’s primary care clinics is the Five Red
Flags, which are the fundamental sources of risk. They are different for each
setting or each team, but some examples would be:

− What are the five medications our patients are on that increase the risk of
having a problem?

− What are the five conditions that we cannot afford to miss in our clinic?
− What are the five tests we cannot afford to lose?
− What are the five ways that the ball gets dropped?

51
The Five Red Flags draw attention to what creates problems, causes risk, and
creates a common mental model and safety net across the care continuum
(Groff, 2003).
Our most recent patient safety lecturer was Craig Clapper who visited in
2009. Mr. Clapper is an expert on engineering systems design. Coming from
the nuclear power industry, he has applied his knowledge of high reliability
organizations (HROs) to transforming the safety culture in hospitals towards the
journey to zero events of harm. In 2008, the Healthcare Improvement
Foundation, which we have been involved with since 2003, and the Regional
Medication Safety Program for hospitals in the Delaware Valley invited Mr.
Clapper’s organization, Healthcare Performance Improvement (HPI) to guide
participating hospitals on their journey to zero events of harm. AMH immediately
agreed to participate and in fact pursued with Mr. Clapper the possibility of being
one of the pilot hospitals. In 2009, we began our work with HPI as one of the
initial pilot hospitals. Mr. Clapper was able to reinforce with all of our staff in his
day of lectures and rounding at AMH the possibility of actually chasing zero
errors with careful study and deliberate design of safe systems in a culture of
caring and learning. The collaborative is focused on creating and fostering a
culture of safety where zero serious events are possible through the creation of a
high reliability organization (HRO). The HPI initiative capitalizes on all of the
current, progressive thinking about creating a culture of safety. There are many
synergies with the IHI and their 100,000 Lives and 5 Million Lives Campaign
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initiatives of 2004 and 2006, as well as with the recommendations of the two
watershed IOM reports of 1999 and 2001.
AMH is at a very critical juncture in our journey to create a culture of safety
with zero harm events. For the past 10 years we have worked assiduously in a
very deliberate fashion to embrace patient safety as a core value of our
organization. We aspire to be one of the safest hospitals in our country. We
have been inspired by gifted patient safety advocates and learned from patient
safety experts some of whom are within our organization. We have set very
aggressive and extensive patient safety goals for our organization. We have
studied the literature, participated in appropriate collaboratives, traveled and
visited other organizations in search of best practices. Through our Innovator’s
Circle Grants we have fostered creativity and innovation and have been
recognized for our unique contributions nationally. We have demonstrated
significant commitment from the Board, leadership, medical staff, employees,
and volunteers to patient safety as our number one priority and a core value for
our organization. We have built an infrastructure to support the execution of our
comprehensive patient safety agenda. We have educated and trained our staff.
We have invested extensively in technology and information systems in support
of patient safety initiatives. We have raised funds from philanthropic individuals
and granting organizations to improve patient safety at AMH. And finally, we
have never lost our focus on patient safety over the past 10 years despite the
many other pressing issues in healthcare.
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All of this is very positive, but have we made a difference to our patients?
Have we achieved measurable improvements? Have we saved lives? Have we
reduced harm events? All of our metrics have improved. We rank in the top
quartile of comparative databases for the Joint Commission Core Measures and
National Patient Safety Goals. We have successfully instituted all 12 IHI
Campaign Measures. We have reduced our mortality (not including hospice
patients) significantly. Our hospital acquired infections (HAIs) continue to
decrease and our hand hygiene rates are above 80% compliance from a starting
point 2 years ago of 30%. More important than these results, we have created a
small army of internal patient safety champions, some are even zealots, and we
have created a Board that is focused and compulsive about its role in overseeing
and supporting our patient safety agenda. They care, they question, and they
look for results.
AMH has always talked about its positive, can do culture as one of its
strengths as a community teaching hospital. Blending a culture of safety with the
existing culture is our current focus. What we want to create is an environment
where everyone is comfortable challenging authority (leadership, medical staff
and trustees) when it comes to our patients’ safety. Safety culture needs to
trump everything we do. Our Chief of Staff and CNO have been very supportive
of staff who question colleagues regarding safety or quality measures. In fact,
employees who ask questions or stop a procedure are thanked for their attention
to detail regardless of whether they were correct or incorrect in their challenge.
The gratitude is for their courage in speaking up. For every 10 questions there
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could be one near miss or error that is prevented. Physicians who dismiss
employees’ appropriate questions are counseled by our Chief of Staff about the
need to respect everyone’s opinions and concerns when it comes to the safety of
our patients.
I am very proud to be part of Abington Memorial Hospital’s journey to a
culture of safety and our pursuit of zero preventable harm events. The agenda is
enormous, at times overwhelming and the journey continuous. The agenda is
also working, results are improving, patients are being treated in a safer
environment, and the rewards are tremendous for patients and staff who are
spared the personal trauma of being involved in a harm event. I am grateful to all
who have made our journey to date such a success. We collectively recognize
how much work still lies ahead of us but we are focused and energized about the
opportunity to create a safer environment for our patients, their families, our
medical staff and our employees.
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